Grounding Word Learning in Space by Samuelson, Larissa K. et al.
Grounding Word Learning in Space
Larissa K. Samuelson
1*, Linda B. Smith
2, Lynn K. Perry
1, John P. Spencer
1
1Department of Psychology and Delta Center, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, United States of America, 2Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana
University, Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America
Abstract
Humans and objects, and thus social interactions about objects, exist within space. Words direct listeners’ attention to
specific regions of space. Thus, a strong correspondence exists between where one looks, one’s bodily orientation, and what
one sees. This leads to further correspondence with what one remembers. Here, we present data suggesting that children
use associations between space and objects and space and words to link words and objects—space binds labels to their
referents. We tested this claim in four experiments, showing that the spatial consistency of where objects are presented
affects children’s word learning. Next, we demonstrate that a process model that grounds word learning in the known
neural dynamics of spatial attention, spatial memory, and associative learning can capture the suite of results reported here.
This model also predicts that space is special, a prediction supported in a fifth experiment that shows children do not use
color as a cue to bind words and objects. In a final experiment, we ask whether spatial consistency affects word learning in
naturalistic word learning contexts. Children of parents who spontaneously keep objects in a consistent spatial location
during naming interactions learn words more effectively. Together, the model and data show that space is a powerful tool
that can effectively ground word learning in social contexts.
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Introduction
Language is fundamentally a social phenomenon and social
cues—following the eye gaze, point, or gesture of a speaker—are
highly informative about the speaker’s state of mind and the
intended referent of a spoken word [1–4]. By some accounts, this
ability to infer the internal mental state of others from such
actions, a competence sometimes called ‘‘mindreading,’’ is what
distinguishes human language from animal communication [2–3].
Relevant to this idea, human infants have been repeatedly shown
to be very good at reading these social cues to intended referents
[1,5]. We know little, however, about the mechanisms on which
these abilities rest. Here, we pursue the hypothesis that the spatial
dimensions of speakers’ actions engage spatially organized
processes of attention and working memory in the listener. Social
cues—eye gaze, points, and gestures—are spatial and orient the
listener’s visual attention. The orientation of visual attention is
known to play an essential role in the working memory processes
that bind features (including multimodal features, [5]) into unified
representations [6]. In brief, toddlers and parents may not be able
to literally share minds, but they have similar cognitive machinery
that allows them to do the next best thing—share a common space
[7,8].
Experiments 1 through 4 are modeled on Baldwin’s classic
demonstration of young children’s ability to read referential intent
[1]. These studies document the role of spatially-grounded
processes in children’s mapping of a name to a referent. A
dynamic neural field (DNF) model that provides a process account
of how children bind visual features to names by virtue of a shared
space, successfully simulates children’s performance and makes a
new prediction tested in Experiment 5. Finally, Experiment 6
connects these cognitive processes to everyday social word
learning.
Results
Behavioral Experiments
The left panel in Fig. 1 shows Baldwin’s original task. A novel
object is presented to a child on one side of a table (see ‘‘Fam. 1’’).
This object is removed and a second novel object is presented on
the other side of the table (‘‘Fam. 2’’). This is repeated across
several familiarization trials. Then, out of view of the child, each
object is placed in a separate opaque bucket. The buckets are
placed on either side of the table. The experimenter looks into one
bucket and says ‘‘Modi!’’ The object from the other bucket is then
taken out and placed on its side of the table (‘‘Repre. 1’’). After the
child examines it, it is removed and the other object is placed on its
side of the table (‘‘Repre. 2’’). After examination, it is also
removed. Both objects are then placed in a transparent container
at the center of the table. The container is pushed toward the
child, and the experimenter asks, ‘‘Can you get me the modi?’’
Baldwin [1] reported that children robustly retrieved the object
that had been in the attended bucket when the name was
provided, supporting the claim that word learning depends on the
inferred referential intent of the speaker and not the temporal
synchrony of a heard word and a seen object.
But does children’s performance in this task depend on the
spatial coincidence of attention when the object is seen and when
the novel word is heard? In the task, children look to and reach for
each object on different sides of the table during familiarization.
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that overlaps with the spatial experience of one object. Prior
research suggests that both adults [9] and young infants [10] can
associate semantic information with locations in space and
maintain indices of this spatial information over time. Thus the
first four experiments presented here test whether the spatial
coincidence of attention and objects at the point of naming is
critical to children’s ability to bind names to unseen objects.
In Experiment 1, 16–18 month-old children participated in
either a No-Switch (original Baldwin) or a Switch condition. The
Switch condition (Fig. 1) differed from Baldwin’s procedure in
that the right-left placement of the objects was switched on the
third familiarization trial. At test, children were given the spoken
name and asked to select the referent from a centrally presented
container. If in the original Baldwin condition children had
succeeded because they had read the referential intent of the
experimenter, they should perform well in both the No-Switch
and Switch conditions here, because the referential cues in both
conditions were strong and identical. If, however, the spatial
alignment of the object-familiarization and naming events were
critical to binding the name and referent, children in the No-
Switch condition should still map the name to the object in the
bucket. By contrast, children in the Switch condition should guess
randomly because neither object has a consistent spatial
mapping.
The results (Fig. 2) support the latter prediction and show that
spatial consistency is necessary for children to map the name to the
hidden object and that the clear referential intent of the
experimenter is not sufficient. Children in the No-Switch
condition who saw the objects consistently on a particular side
of the table during familiarization chose the intended referent on
.73 of test trials, which is reliably greater than chance (.50),
t(11)=5.01, p,.01, and comparable to Baldwin’s original finding.
But when the spatial location of the objects varied prior to naming,
children’s choices did not differ from chance levels (.48, t,1.00),
but did differ significantly from performance in the No-Switch
condition, t(22)=3.34, p,.01. One concern with young children is
whether they understood the task in both conditions. Thus, we
included ‘filler’ test trials in which children were asked to pick one
of two familiar objects by name (‘‘where’s the spoon?’’). Children
in all conditions (in experiments 1–5) chose the named toy on
more than .80 of the filler trials showing that they understood the
testing procedure.
Results of Experiment 1 suggest that spatial consistency is a key
factor for success in the Baldwin task and that the clear referential
intent of the speaker is not sufficient. Still, clear referential intent
may be necessary. To probe this issue, we took away the buckets in
Experiment 2. Naming objects unseen because they are in buckets
is quite natural within a social pragmatics account. Providing a
name while pointing to an empty table-top would seem a more
Figure 1. The tasks used in Experiments 1–5. The far left panel shows the original Baldwin (1993) task [1], a classic demonstration of children’s
use of social cues in word learning, that we used as the basis of our studies. Experiment 1 replicates the Baldwin task in the No-Switch condition and
tests the necessity of spatial consistency for children’s performance in the Switch condition. Experiment 2 tested the necessity of the buckets in this
task by removing them from the critical naming event—the experimenter simply pointed to the empty space on the table where one of the objects
had been during familiarization and said the name. In Experiment 3 a more diffuse spatial cue was provided. During the naming event the
experimenter held her hand out to one side of the table and snapped, directing children’s attention, generally, to one side or the other. Experiment 4
pitted prior consistency in space against temporal contiguity. We gave children consistent spatial experience with two objects as in the previous
experiments, but during the naming event in the experimental condition the experimenter pointed to and labeled a visibly-present object. Critically,
the object was in an inconsistent spatial position. A control condition confirmed that children this age would bind a name and object presented
ostensively. Experiment 5 tests the prediction from the DNF model that children cannot use color cues to bind names with objects. During
familiarization, each object was presented at the center of the table but consistently on either a red or a blue tray. During the naming event, one of
the two colored trays was presented at the center of the table and the experimenter pointed to it and said the label. The final test event was exactly
as in the prior experiments.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028095.g001
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during naming in Experiment 2, the experimenter pointed to the
empty space on the table where one of the objects had been during
familiarization and said the name. Children picked the target
object on .72 of the test trials (Fig. 2), which is significantly
different from chance, t(15)=7.0, p,.001. Thus, spatial consis-
tency is sufficient for children to succeed even given what is likely
an unusual naming event and an unusual social pragmatics
context for children this age (see [11], and [12] for evidence that
parents of children in the age range tested here do not often talk
about absent objects).
Experiment 3 took this one step further. At the moment the
name was provided, with no objects in view, the experimenter held
her hand out to one side of the table, snapped her fingers in the
air, and said the name (‘‘modi’’), pulling the child’s visual attention
in one direction at the moment of naming. If the direction of visual
attention plays a role in binding the name to the previously-seen
object, then even this diffuse spatial cue should be sufficient for
children to map the name to a spatially-anchored memory of an
object. Children chose correctly on .67 of test trails, significantly
above chance levels, t(15)=3.47, p=.01. Experiments 1–3,
therefore, show that children’s ability to map a name to an object
that is not physically present depends critically on the direction of
visual attention at the moment of naming and on object memories
tied to, or indexed by, locations in the task space (see [10] for
related data with 6 month-old infants).
The original Baldwin task was designed to create an ambiguous
word-learning context in which children relied on social
pragmatics. Everyday word learning, of course, often has less
ambiguity in that children hear a name when they are looking at
an object with a speaker giving clear referential cues; thus, the seen
object, the heard name, and the referential cues are spatially and
temporally aligned. Experiment 4 asks whether it is sufficient for
these cues to align in-the-moment, or whether spatially anchored
object memories still play a role in these unambiguous naming
contexts. Children were given consistent spatial experience with
two objects prior to naming and then an unambiguous naming
event in which the experimenter pointed to and labeled a visibly-
present object at a location incongruent with the previous experiences
(Fig. 1). To measure the role of the spatially incongruent
experiences prior to naming, this was compared to a control
condition in which the experimenter again pointed to the object
while naming but with no prior object familiarization. Consistent
with other findings (e.g., [13]) young children selected the named
object at test .79 of the time in the Control condition, which is
different from chance levels, t(13)=4.95, p,.001, (Fig. 2). In the
Experimental condition, however, the inconsistent spatial experi-
ence disrupted word learning: they selected the ostensively named
object only .41 of the time, a result that is not different from
chance, t(15)=21.05, ns.
Model
Although the social pragmatics perspective has generated a
wealth of empirical data on young children’s ‘‘mindreading,’’ it is
not clear what mechanisms underlie such abilities. Researchers
often point toward the mirror neuron system as a possible neural
Figure 2. Performance of children and model in Experiments 1–5. Children’s percent of correct choices for each experiment (black bars) with
standard deviations (range of error bars). *s indicate performance significantly above chance (.50 in a two item forced-choice task). The mean
performance of the Dynamic Neural Field model (across 12 batches of simulations) for all experiments is also shown (white bars). Error bars show the
standard deviation of the model’s performance (across 12 batches of simulations) per condition, relative to the target means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028095.g002
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captured by the mirror neuron system are quite different from the
behaviors probed in developmental studies, and there is much
debate regarding the mirror neuron system’s role in ‘‘mind-
reading’’ [15]. Thus, at present, there is no neurally-grounded
framework that captures how children behave in experiments like
the Baldwin experiment that are purported to tap into children’s
understanding of social pragmatics.
One way in which the shared-space account goes beyond a
social pragmatics perspective is its ability to tie word learning to
known neural processes of spatial attention, spatial memory, and
associative learning. The dynamic neural field (DNF) model
presented here is a demonstration proof that such links can be
formalized in a way that quantitatively captures children’s
performance and generates novel behavioral predictions open to
empirical test (see Experiment 5). The DNF model is based on an
understanding of the neural population dynamics that underlie
elementary forms of perception [16], working memory [17,18],
and motor planning [19], as well as the development of these
cognitive processes [20,21]. As such, the model provides a
theoretical bridge between word learning in a shared space and
other cognitive abilities that emerge in early development.
The DNF model also provides solutions to several theoretical
challenges evident in the Baldwin task. First, word learning is often
treated as a computationally slow process requiring many
presentations [22]. Likewise, visual feature extraction for novel
objects is often modeled in a way that requires many exposures to
an object in different poses [23]. This contrasts with children’s
ability in the present experiments to pick out the referent of the
novel word after a single naming event. The DNF model we
propose achieves such ‘‘fast-mapping’’ using an architecture
recently proposed by Faubel and Scho ¨ner [24]. This architecture
uses previously-learned mappings from low-level visual cues to
cortical neural populations with receptive fields ‘‘tuned’’ to
features such as hue, aspect ratio, and orientation. These features
are ‘bound’ on-the-fly using words, and associations are built over
a trial-to-trial timescale using a variant of Hebbian learning.
Next, we incorporate a second architecture proposed by
Johnson and colleagues [25] that provides a solution to a different
challenge—binding visual features together into an integrated
object representation. As one progresses through the ventral object
recognition pathway of the primate visual system, there are several
key changes in neural response properties, including changes in
the complexity of the features coded [26] and a dramatic increase
in receptive field sizes and an accompanying decrease in the spatial
resolution of receptive fields [27,28]. This type of neural coding
can create a binding problem in vision: it can be difficult to know
which features go together when two or more objects are
presented simultaneously ([29,30]; although see [31] for critiques
of this view). Johnson et al. [25] implemented a neurally-grounded
approach to this problem by binding features together by virtue of
their shared spatial location using detailed spatial information
represented in cortical fields in the dorsal visual pathway (for
related ideas, see [32]). We integrate this architecture into the
DNF model used here. This enables our system to bind visual
features together in a spatial frame of reference and, in concert
with the Faubel and Scho ¨ner architecture, to ground word
learning in space and time.
Figure 3 shows the new DNF model we propose that builds on
these previous innovations and uses a table-centered frame of
reference to link both actors (see [33]). Panels A and B of Figure 3
show a variant of the Johnson et al. model with two cortical
fields—a shape-space field and a color-space field. These cortical
layers have cells with bimodal receptive fields: they are sensitive to,
for instance, both the shape of an object (e.g., its aspect ratio) and
its spatial position. Note that Johnson et al. demonstrated that
localized ‘‘peaks’’ of activation (see red circles of activation in
Figure 3. Dynamic Neural Field (DNF) model that captured
Experiments 1–4 performance and predicted Experiment 5
behavior. Panels A and B show a variant of Johnson et al.’s [10] model
of visual feature binding; panels C and D show a variant of the Faubel
and Scho ¨ner’s [17] model of fast object recognition. Our integration
brings these prior models together to encode and bind visual features
in real time as ‘‘peaks’’ of neural activation built in the shape-space (red
hot spots in A) and color-space fields (red hot spots in B) via local
excitation and surround inhibition (see [38]). Binding is achieved
through the shared spatial coupling between these fields. Labels
(words) are fed into the label-feature fields shown in C and D. These
fields can bind labels to the visual features encoded by the visuo-spatial
system via in-the-moment coupling across the shared feature
dimensions (shape to shape; color to color). A Hebbian process enables
the model to learn which features were where from trial to trial and also
learn the label-feature associations quickly to influence performance on
subsequent test trials. This figure also shows a simulation of the model
at key points in time as we capture events in our experimental task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028095.g003
Grounding Word Learning in Space
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 December 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 12 | e28095Fig. 3A) can build in such cortical fields via local excitation and
surround inhibition even with broad spatial receptive fields,
thereby mimicking the tuning properties of neurons in the ventral
pathway [27,28]. These localized peaks—‘‘bound’’ object repre-
sentations in the model—are achieved through coupled activation
along the shared spatial dimension which is evident in Figure 3A
and 3B: there is a light vertical ‘‘ridge’’ of activity passed between
the shape-space and color-space fields on the left side of these
panels—the model has encoded the shape and color of the object
on the left. In the present report, we added a Hebbian learning
process to the feature-space fields [34]. Consequently, the model
learns which features were where from trial to trial.
Panels C and D of Figure 3 show the second part of the DNF
architecture—a variant of the Faubel and Scho ¨ner model with two
label-feature fields. Once again, these cortical layers have cells
with bimodal receptive fields. Now, however, they are receptive to
input from label neurons—population representations of the
spoken word—and featural input from the feature-space fields
(A, B). These fields, therefore, bind labels to the visual features
encoded by the visuo-spatial system via in-the-moment coupling
across the shared feature dimensions (shape to shape; color to
color). As in Faubel and Scho ¨ner [24], a Hebbian process enables
the model to learn these label-feature associations quickly and
influence performance on subsequent test trials. Note that neural
interactions across the label dimension are winner-take-all with
sharp boundaries between one label and the next (i.e., local
excitation spreads minimally from one unit to the next; see se,z in
Table 1). Such interactions thus capture the discrete-like nature of
word representations common in connectionist models of early
word learning (e.g., [22,35,36]).
Figure 3 shows a simulation of the model at key points in time in
the experimental task. On the first familiarization trial, an
irregularly shaped yellow polygon (binoculars) is presented on
the left side of the table. These features are encoded and bound by
the model, forming peaks of activation on the left side of the
feature-space fields (red hot spots in A, B). Note that the specific
feature values cued are somewhat arbitrary; for simplicity, we
assume all inputs are distinctive along the shape and color
dimensions (see [21]). Once peaks form in the feature-space fields,
they project activation into the label-feature fields at the associated
Table 1. Parameter values for DNF model.
Type general self-excitationx,z surround inhibitionx,z self-excitationy surround inhibitiony
Global
te=80
ti=10
bwithin-field=5
bbetween-fields=1
htest=2.1
hq=.5
snoise=1
q=.075
field size=91
Space-Feature Fields
h=26.35 ce,x=.8 ci,x=.3 ce,y=.8 ci,y=.3
ki,x=.18 se,x=3 si,x=18 se,y=3 si,y=6
Label-Feature Fields
h=211.55 ce,z=1.6 ci,z=.3 ce,y=1.6 ci,y=.6
ki,z=.35 se,z=1 si,z=60 se,y=3 si,y=6
Gaussian Projections Across Space
ce=.162
se=3
Gaussian Projections Across Labels
ce=.4
se=1
Gaussian Projections Across Features
ce,zRx=.06
se,zRx=10
ce,xRz=.2
se,xRz=3
Hebbian Layers
tbuild=4500 se,x=1 se,y=3
tdecay=50000 se,z=1 se,y=3
ce=.8
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028095.t001
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labels are presented (i.e., no labels were provided by the
experimenter), the model does not associate the yellow binoculars
with a particular name. Comparable events happen on familiar-
ization trial 2. Now, peaks of activation form on the right side of
the feature-space fields, binding the curvy, pink features of the
spring together. Note the light blue trace on the left side of the
feature-space fields: this is the Hebbian trace of the plastic
binoculars created on the previous trial.
At the start of the naming event, the experimenter’s actions
(look into left bucket/point at left location) create a ridge of spatial
activation on the left that is propagated across the feature-space
fields (E, F). At the same time, the experimenter says the label
‘‘Modi!’’ which propagates a ridge of activation across the label-
feature fields at the 7
th label position (G, H). As neural interactions
grow stronger in the feature-space fields, peaks emerge at the
feature values associated with the binoculars—the model recalls
that the binoculars were on the left (I, J). This, in turn, sends
activation into the feature-label fields which stimulates neurons
already stimulated by the presentation of the label. Consequently,
a peak emerges at the 7
th label position at neural sites associated
with the binocular features (K, L). This binds the name ‘‘modi’’ to
the binocular features, and a Hebbian process creates a trace of
this association that can subserve performance on later trials.
On the test trial, the novel name is presented, passing a ridge of
activation into the label-feature fields as before. In addition, the
two objects are presented in the task space at new locations (on a
tray in the center, bright dots in M, N). As can be seen in panels O
and P, the re-presentation of the same label (‘‘get the modi!’’)
enables the model to recall the features of the binoculars. This
passes activation into the feature-space fields, biasing the model to
build peaks at the binocular shape and the yellow color. Note that
spatial coupling plays a role here, ensuring the multiple features of
the same object are correctly bound together. At the end of this
simulation, the model correctly ‘picks’ the binoculars.
We used this model to simulate Experiments 1–4, event by
event, all with the same parameter setting. To simulate the No-
Switch condition of Experiment 1, for example, we presented the
model the same sequence of events we gave the child—binoculars
on the left, spring on the right, binoculars left, spring right, two
buckets and a name, spring on the right, binoculars on the left,
then both objects in the center and the label (see Materials and
Methods). The model correctly bound the visual features of the
objects during the familiarization trials, and it formed associations
between visual features and the label when a word was presented.
On the test trial, we read out which peak in the feature-space fields
was sustained at the end of the trial—this indicated the model’s
choice. We did this for 100 simulations of each task from
Experiments 1–4, and replicated these simulation experiments 12
times to probe the model’s robustness. This was akin to running
each child through 100 iterations of each task to robustly estimate
how that child would respond (in a perfect world where the child
would tolerate such a thing), and collecting data on 12 children
(the smallest N across experiments). Note that the multiple
iterations were necessary given the stochastic nature of neural
activation in the model (i.e., the neural dynamics were influenced
by multiple noise sources from timestep to timestep; see Model and
Simulation Details below).
As is clear in Figure 2, the model superbly captured children’s
behavior across all variants of the Baldwin task. The white bars
show average performance of the model across the 12 runs for
each experiment. The error bars show the standard deviation of
the model’s performance relative to each empirical mean across
the 12 batches of simulations for each condition. This provides a
measure of the model’s variability relative to the target empirical
value. In all cases, the empirical means are quantitatively near or
within the range of variability produced by the model. Moreover,
the model standard deviations are well within the range defined by
the empirical standard deviations.
Test of Model
Space is critical both in the model and in contemporary
understanding of the neural processes that underlie visual attention
and action as well as the binding of features into integrated object
representations [6,32,37,38]. Indeed, recent studies show that
position dependence persists throughout the ventral visual
pathway, even into areas such as the inferior temporal cortex
which was once thought to be spatially invariant [39–42]. This
contrasts with approaches that treat space as a generic featural cue
and pursue other binding mechanisms (e.g., neuronal synchrony,
see [43,44]). To examine the special role of space in the model, we
asked whether the model was able to map a name to an object if
some feature other than space was aligned across initial interactions
with the objects and the naming event. Thus, during familiariza-
tion, two objects were presented on differently colored trays that
were always centered, that is, there was a unique color associated
with each object but space was always the same (see Fig. 1). During
the naming event, no objects were presented, but one of the colors
associated with one object was. This was followed by two re-
presentation trials during which each object and its appropriate
color cue were presented to the feature-space fields. As can be seen
in Figure 2, the model failed to use this non-spatial association to
pick the correct object at test, performing at chance levels.
Experiment 5 tested this prediction with children. During
familiarization, each object was presented at the center of the table
but consistently on either a red or a blue tray (see Fig. 1). During
the naming event, one of the two colored trays was presented at
the center of the table and the experimenter pointed to it saying
the label. The objects were then re-presented, one at a time, on
their respective trays in the center of the table. The final test event
was exactly as in the prior experiments. As can be seen in Figure 2,
children picked the object that corresponded with the color
presented during naming only .47 of the time, a rate that is not
significantly different from chance performance, t(15)=2.522, ns.
Importantly, children were able to match the novel objects to their
previously-paired colors; correctly recalling the color when
presented with the objects on .70 of memory-check trials that
occurred after the main test phase.
One could argue that the lack of binding shown by children in
this experiment could be because the act of pointing to the empty
colored tray was not viewed by the child as a referential act.
However, in Experiment 2 children succeeded in binding the name
and object when naming occurred in a very similar context—
pointing to an empty spatial location. Thus, we argue, the
differential binding results across Experiments 2 and 5 confirm the
prediction that space—and the spatial direction of attention—is
indeed special in its ability to bind names to objects in this task.
Behavioral Extension
Experiments 1–5 show that children use spatial consistency to
bind names to objects in a classic task designed to invite children to
read social cues provided by the experimenter. The final question
we ask is whether the spatially-grounded processes reflected in
these experiments and in the DNF model play a role in everyday
social interactions in which toddlers learn object names. These
interactions often involve multiple objects in a single context, and
those objects are regularly moved about. Nonetheless, some degree
Grounding Word Learning in Space
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learning.
To investigate this, in a sixth experiment we asked caregivers to
teach their 17- to 22-month-old children names of two objects
novel to the children. Parents were not told the experimental
hypothesis nor was the use of space mentioned in any way. An
experimenter later tested the children to determine whether they
had learned the object names. Videotapes of parent-child
interactions were coded to determine the spatial consistency of
the objects while on the table, in the parent’s hands, or in the
child’s hands, and to record all naming events. Overall, parents
spontaneously maintained a consistent spatial arrangement of the
two objects during the social interaction, consistently holding the
objects in different hands .75 of the time (i.e., the binoculars in the
left hand, the spring in the right hand), and maintaining spatial
consistency .65 of the time even when only one object was being
presented (e.g., holding and presenting the spring always with the
right hand). Interestingly, parents differed in the degree to which
they maintained this spatial consistency: the proportion of time
during which the two objects were in two different hands ranged
from .32–1.0 and the spatial consistency ranged from .43–.86 (see
Fig. 4 for data from two caregiver-child pairs). Critically, this
mattered for children’s learning of the object names: the more
consistent a parent kept the spatial location of the objects, the
better her child did on the later comprehension task, r=.69,
p,.001, two-tailed (see Fig. 5). Children’s learning was not
correlated with age (r=.23, ns), total number of times parents
named the objects (r=2.21, ns), or amount of time parents spent
holding the objects (r=2.047, ns). Moreover, children’s own
behaviors on the objects did not show a consistent spatial pattern
as they most often held objects in both hands and at midline.
In summary, spatial consistency on the part of the mature social
partner appears to play a role in naturalistic parent-child
interactions and to support word learning. According to our
model, such consistency enables children to bind heard names
with seen objects over multiple naming events. But why would
parents spontaneously maintain this spatial consistency? One likely
answer is that parents have the same cognitive system as their
children, one that integrates and indexes information in working
memory via visuo-spatial attention, and this organization is
reflected in social exchanges with children. It is also possible that
over the course of prior interactions parents have picked up on the
usefulness of spatial consistency and have learned to use it to
facilitate communication. Either way, this final experiment
highlights the role space plays in grounding children’s learning
of novel names in real-world social situations.
Discussion
There is no denying that language is a fundamentally social
phenomenon. It is the medium of human communication and thus
requires a social connection between those engaged in the process
of passing information back and forth. It is not surprising, then,
that even young infants tune into the social nature of language and
begin to use social cues to meaning and intention in the service of
language learning from an early age (for review see [45]). In fact,
the contrast between young children’s precocious ‘‘mindreading’’
skills and those of other animals [2] as well as atypically developing
children [46] has put social cues at the center of explanations of
language learning [1–4].
The present results and model provide a fine-grained, neurally-
grounded, and mechanistic account for children’s abilities inspired
by the growing number of studies of toddlers and adults showing
an exquisite coupling of the body’s momentary spatial orientation
and internal cognitive operations [8,47]. Specifically we have
shown that children can use consistency in spatial location to bind
a novel name to a novel object in an ambiguous naming situation.
In this way then, these studies suggest that the direction of visual
attention can be used as a deictic reference to bind objects in the
physical environment to cognitive variables that can be used in
mental operations. Likewise, in the social context of early word
learning, the spatially consistent actions by the mature partner
align the direction of visual attention and the object that is the
momentary ‘‘topic’’ of interest for the two social partners, and in
this way may also influence the internal cognitive operations of
their social partner [8,48]. Thus the impressive ‘‘mindreading’’
skills infants demonstrate in the service of word learning need not
depend solely on inferential processes or internal models of others’
minds, processes which might well be too slow to account for the
smoothness of social interactions and adjustments that happen on
the order of milliseconds [49,50]. Instead, shared sensory-motor
coupling might emerge as the driving force, a consequence of the
shared physical space in which bodies and cognitive systems are
embedded.
For these young learners, spatial consistency mattered more
than the clarity of the referential intent of the speaker during the
naming event. This need not imply that words are not referential for
young children (see [51] for the importance of this issue in the
literature on early lexical development). Words refer in the sense
that they are symbols that point. Often this pointing is to a physical
object located space; sometimes the point is to an entity in memory
Figure 4. Representative data from two parent-child pairs in
Experiment 6. Blue blocks show the time course of the object
positions over a 45 second section of the interaction (starting at the top
of the figure). Black bars refer to object 1 (binoculars in these examples),
white bars refer to object 2 (spring in these examples). Hash marks
across bars indicate naming. Right-left spatial position of the object is
coded from the child’s perspective as in the parent’s hand on the left
(LH), in the parent’s hand on the right (RH), on the table to the left (LT)
or on the table to the right (RT). Screen shots from recordings are
provided to illustrate the placement of objects at the point of the
interaction indicated by the arrow. Insets in pictures are from the
overhead cameras. As can be clearly seen, parent 1 kept the objects
clearly separated—the binoculars (black bars) are kept on the child’s left
and the spring (white bars) is on the right. In contrast, parent 2 did not
maintain a consistent spatial segregation of the objects. Rather, early in
this segment (top of blue block) she kept both objects on the child’s
left. Later (bottom of blue block) she switched both objects to the
child’s right side (bottom of figure). Data from the comprehension test
reveal that children of parents who kept the objects segregated, like
parent 1, learned the words best (see main text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028095.g004
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[9,52]. Within the human cognitive system, then, the referential
nature of words may be inherently spatial; pointing to spatially
localized objects (or events) in the world or spatially indexed
entities in memory. Spatial consistency thus may provide better
cues for ‘‘reference’’ in this indexical pointing sense then activities
of the speaker at the moment of naming. We suggest that the
theoretical construct of reference in early word learning has its
mechanistic reality in the literal sense of pointing. Consistent with
this idea, recent studies of eye-tracking in adults document the
strong influence of words on the direction of visual attention, as
adults appear to mandatorily attend to a named object even if it is
irrelevant to the task [53] or the location [54] where the named
object had been. Fereirra et al. [52] suggest that these word-
localized attention effects reflect the fundamental nature of online
word comprehension: words automatically direct looking to the
location (or remembered location) of a mentioned object (see also,
[55,56]), that is, they literally point to locations for attention.
The adult studies on the strong link between words and the
direction of visual attention suggest that the role of spatial
consistency in word learning observed here may not be specific to
young children but may also be measurable in adults (albeit most
likely when limitations are imposed on adult cognitive resources).
However, there are also possibilities of change, as the evidence
suggests developmental improvement in the ability to update an
objects’ location with respect to self, given movement by the
perceiver [57–60]. In the present report, we used a dynamic
neural field model that encoded and remembered locations in a
table-centered reference frame [33]. Although this is consistent
with the spatial cognitive literature, a head- or body-centered
frame would have yielded the same results given that children were
not actively moved during the procedure. Clearly, however, there
are developmental changes in children’s ability to stably remember
locations in a world-centered frame beyond 18 months (see, e.g.,
[61]). We suspect such changes may alter how children ground
objects and words in space—and how well they may be able to
update their memories for those object locations given moving
objects or self-movement. Future work will be needed to probe
how changing abilities in spatial representations in early childhood
may influence the role of spatial consistency in early word
learning.
In conclusion, the present experiments and DNF simulations
provide new insights into the neural mechanisms that enable the
early social coupling children demonstrate in service of word
learning. Since Posner’s [50] classic paper on attention as a spatial
spotlight, considerable evidence shows how visuo-spatial processes
are essential for the perception, representation, and tracking of
objects. The current findings show these processes at work in early
word learning via shared space. The central message of these
experiments is that sharing space may be the social process that
enables the emergence of so-called ‘mindreading’ in early
development. What we have done here is to make this process
open to analysis, not just at a behavioral level, but also at a neural
level via our DNF model. In so doing, we have grounded social
word learning in known processes of object recognition and visual
binding. This then opens the door to understanding—and
experimentally testing—the mechanisms that underlie the social
and spatially-grounded nature of early word learning.
Materials and Methods
Behavioral Studies
Ethics Statement. Parents of all child participants provided
informed consent prior to the experiment. All experimental
protocols were approved by the Indiana University Institutional
Review Board. In particular, the committee approved the consent
materials which were signed by the parents of the participating
children and are on file at the University.
Figure 5. Correlation between parents’ spatial consistency and children’s learning of novel names in Experiment 6. Graph plots
individual children’s total number of correct choices across the 6 trials of the novel name learning test according to the spatial consistency ratio of
that child’s parent. Spatial consistency was defined as the percent of time the parent held the novel objects in the same right-left position (each
object relative to the other), out of the total amount of time the objects were in separate hands.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028095.g005
Grounding Word Learning in Space
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 December 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 12 | e28095Samples. Twenty-four 17–18-month-old children, 12
females, participated in Experiment 1. They were randomly
assigned to two between-subject conditions, Switch and No-
Switch. All children completed the warm-up trials. Two additional
children were replaced due to shyness. Sixteen 17–19-month-old
children, 8 females, participated in Experiment 2. All children
completed the warm-up trials. Sixteen 17–19-month-old children,
8 females, participated in Experiment 3. Two children were
replaced because of fussiness and failure to do the warm-up task.
Twenty-eight 17–19-month-old children, 14 females, participated
in Experiment 4. Children were randomly assigned to the
experimental or control conditions. Three children were
replaced due to fussiness or failure to do the warm-up trials.
Sixteen 17–18-month-old children, 8 females, participated in
Experiment 5. All children completed the warm-up trials. Thirty
17–22-month-old children and their parents, participated in
Experiment 6. All children completed the task. Children in all
experiments were from monolingual middle-class homes in a
Midwestern town. Participant names were obtained from public
birth records. They were recruited via a letter sent to their parents
and a follow-up phone call.
Stimuli. Novel stimuli for all experiments were drawn from a
set of five objects: a colorful spring, collapsible binoculars, a noise
maker, a transparent cube with moving colored beads inside, and
a toy hand drill. Each object was between 5–7 cm in length, 4–
7 cm in height, and 4 cm in width. Two identical grey plastic
buckets, 15 cm high with a diameter of 12 cm, were used in
Experiment 1. Prototypical examples of categories well-known by
children this age were used as warm-up and filler items (e.g., cat,
ball, duck) all approximately the same size as target items. A small
transparent container (10610 cm, 5 cm high) was used to present
objects during testing. This test container was small enough that
the objects were virtually on top of each other but both see-able
(see Fig. 1). In Experiment 5, two 40 cm diameter colored trays,
one red one blue, were used.
Procedure and Equipment. In Experiment 1, the child and
the experimenter sat across from each other at a small table. The
experiment began with warm-up trials designed to familiarize the
child with the testing procedure used at the end of the session. The
experimenter first introduced the child to a stuffed bear (who will
‘‘ask’’ the test questions). She then presented the child with two
familiar objects (e.g., airplane and rabbit), and told the child the
names (‘‘See this airplane. Look, here is a bunny’’). The
experimenter then put the objects in the test container and told
the child that he needed to get the object the bear asked for. The
bear then ‘‘looked’’ at the container, and said ‘‘Get the airplane.’’
Correct choices were cheered and incorrect choices were
corrected. This was repeated with different toys until the child
correctly indicated the requested object on 4 out of 4 trials.
The familiarization phase for block 1 then began (see Fig. 1).
The target object was presented first, either 25 cm to the right or
25 cm to the left of midline. The experimenter held the object up,
saying ‘‘Look at this. See this.’’ for 5 s and then gave the object to
the child, by pushing it toward the child following an imaginary
line approximately 25 cm off midline so that the child looked and
reached to the object on that side. After the child examined the
object for approximately 5 s, the experimenter took it back, again
moving it along the same imaginary line along which it had been
presented. The experimenter then presented the distractor object
25 cm off midline on the opposite side and repeated the procedure.
This whole procedure was repeated for a total of four
familiarization trials. In the No-Switch condition, the target was
consistently presented on one side of the table and the distractor
on the other. In the Switch condition, the side on which the target
and distractor were presented switched from trial to trial. This is
the only difference between the two conditions.
Following familiarization, the experimenter placed the target
and distracter objects in separate buckets, out of view of the child.
The buckets were placed on the table, one 25 cm to the right of
midline, the other 25 cm to the left of midline, such that the
bucket containing the target was on the same side as the last
presentation of the target during the familiarization phase. Next
the experimenter tapped one bucket, and said ‘‘modi’’ (or
‘‘dawnoo’’) three times, while looking straight into the child’s
eyes. Note that this is a change from Baldwin’s [1] original
procedure in which the experimenter looked into the bucket. We
made this change because in later experiments the experimenter
would be looking at an empty location in space (Experiment 1) or
to her snapping fingers (Experiment 3). Thus, in order to keep the
procedure for our studies consistent, the experimenter looked into
the child’s eyes during the naming portion of Experiments 1–5.
Note that one could argue this change makes the naming event less
salient in our experiments compared to Baldwin’s. However, in
that case the change would be working against our hypothesis.
Further, the fact that we replicate her results in the No-Switch
condition of Experiment 1 almost exactly, suggests that not looking
at the child rather than in the bucket did not alter performance.
Following the naming event, the experimenter took the
distracter from the un-named bucket and gave it to the child to
examine for approximately 5 s before taking it back. Then the
experimenter took the target from the named bucket, gave it to the
child for approximately 5 s and took it back. The test phase
followed immediately. These trials were structured identically to
the warm-up trials but without feedback. Both objects were placed
in the test container at midline, and the bear ‘‘asked’’ the child to
‘‘Get the modi (or dawnoo).’’ During this period, the experimenter
maintained her gaze directly at the child’s eyes. Four test trials
with the target and distractor were alternated with 4 filler trials in
which the bear asked children to select between pairs of familiar
toys previously seen in the warm-up. These were included to
maintain interest, to break up the 4 requests for the target and
ensure children understood the task. This whole procedure
(excluding warm-up) was then repeated with the other target-
distractor pair. The order of target-distractor pairs, assignment of
objects to target/distractor status, side associated with the naming
event and whether the modi or dawnoo set was first or second,
were all counter-balanced across children within each condition.
The procedure took approximately 25 minutes. During the
procedure one video-camera was focused on the child (and parent
who typically sat next to or behind the child). A second video
camera was focused on the experimenter.
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to the No-Switch
condition of Experiment 1 with the exception that no buckets were
used. During the naming phase all objects were removed so there
was just the empty tabletop. The experimenter, while looking in
the child’s eyes, pointed to the spot on the table where the target
object had been introduced during familiarization (that is, 25 cm
to the right or left of midline) and said ‘‘modi’’ three times. During
the re-presentation phase, the experimenter presented the
distractor object (the one associated with the un-named side) first,
then the target object (the one associated with the named side).
Testing was the same as in Experiment 1. In this experiment,
children only received one block of trials due to the oddity of the
naming event and because of the consistency of responding in the
No-Switch condition of Experiment 1.
The procedure for Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2
with the exception of the naming phase during which the
experimenter held her arm out at shoulder height to the side the
Grounding Word Learning in Space
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 December 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 12 | e28095target had been presented on and snapped her fingers while saying
the name ‘‘modi’’ three times, all the while looking in the child’s
eyes.
The procedure for the Space v. Time condition of Experiment 4
was identical to No-Switch condition of Experiment 1 with three
exceptions. First, there were 8 total familiarization trials (rather
than 4). Second, during the naming event, the experimenter put
one of the objects on the table—at the location associated with the other
object—and with the object in view, pointed to and named it, saying
the name, ‘‘modi,’’ three times. Third, there was no re-
presentation phase. Instead a 5 s delay was imposed before the
experimenter started the first test trial. Children in the Control
condition of this experiment participated only from the naming
event forward.
The procedure for Experiment 5 was like that of Experiment 1
with the exception that the object-location correspondences were
replaced with object-tray-color correspondences. During familiar-
ization, one object was presented twice at midline on a red tray
and the other was presented twice at midline on a blue tray. Then,
during naming the experimenter brought out one tray with
nothing on it and, while looking straight in child’s eyes, said
‘‘modi’’ three times. The red tray was used as the target tray for
half the children and the blue tray for the other half. The target
tray color remained the same on both blocks. During re-
presentation, each object was presented on its appropriate tray.
The test phase was identical to previous experiments. A memory
test followed during which children were asked to put each object
on the tray on which it belonged. Performance was greater than
.70 across children on these trials.
In Experiment 6 parents were told to play with the two training
toys, to show children how they worked and to attempt to teach
them their names. They were told the task was about how children
attend to objects when learning about new objects and their names
and that the parents should be as natural as possible. The
experimenter left the room after turning on the cameras. Two
cameras were used, one facing the child directly and one
overhead. Parents demonstrated the training toys to their child
for 2 minutes. Then the experimenter came in and played with the
child with a filler toy for approximately 2 minutes. This was done
to familiarize the child with the experimenter prior to the test
trials. The experimenter left and the parent demonstrated the
experimental toys for another 2 minutes. The experimenter then
tested the child in the name comprehension test. On each trial,
two choices were given to the child to handle. They were then
taken by the experimenter and placed on the two ends of an 46 cm
tray. Holding the tray close to her body, with the two objects fully
in view by the child but unreachable, the experimenter asked the
child to get one object by name (e.g., ‘‘Where is the modi? get the
modi,’’). The tray was pushed forward for the child to indicate
their choice. The two experimental objects served as the choice
objects on 6 trials with each object the labeled target on 3 trials.
The remaining 6 trials used three filler sets, asking for each object
once. The side of the correct choice was randomly determined for
each trial.
Coding and Analysis. Children’s responses during the test
trials of all experiments were coded for the object selected on each
trial by a scorer who was blind to the procedure and who also did
not see the familiarization and re-presentation trials and so did not
know the right answer. The first point, touch, or a pick of an object
was scored as the child’s choice. A second coder scored the
experimenter’s direction of gaze and the parent’s behavior during
testing to ensure that that neither influenced the child’s choices. A
third coder re-scored 25% of these tapes; reliability exceeded 90%
on all categories for all experiments. In addition, for Experiment 6,
the moment-by-moment interaction of the mother and child as
they played with the objects was coded using MacShapa coding
software. At each moment of the session a primary coder recorded
the location of the objects in terms of the right-center-left
placement on the table or in the parent or child’s hand. Naming
events by the parent and child were also recorded and tagged to
the moment in time when they occurred. A second coder coded
15% of the data. Agreement was over 87% for all participants and
all codes.
Model and Simulation Details
Below we define the equations for the four dynamic neural fields
in the model used to capture children’s early word-learning
performance: the space-shape field (ssf), the space-color field (scf),
the label-shape field (lsf), and the label-color field (lcf). Each field
equation specifies the rate of change of neural activation, _ u u, over
two field dimensions. We adopt the following convention for the
dimensions: x refers to the spatial dimension, y1 and y2 specify the
two visual feature dimensions (shape, color), and z refers to the
label dimension.
Activation in the space-shape field, ussf, is governed by the
following equation:
t _ u ussf(x,y1)~{ussf(x,y1)zhssfzhqjtzhtestzSt(x,y1) ð1Þ
z
ð ð
G(x{x’,y1{y’1)L(ussf(x’,y’1))dx’dy’1 ð2Þ
{
ð ð
G(x{x’,y1{y’1)L(ussf(x’,y’1))dx’dy’1
{ki,ssf
ð ð
L(ussf(x’,y’1))dx’dy’1 ð3Þ
z
ð
dy’2
ð
G(x{x’)L(uscf(x’,y’2))dx’ ð4Þ
z
ð
dz’
ð
G(y1{y’1)L(ulsf(z’,y’1))dy’1 ð5Þ
z
ð ð
G(x{x’,y1{y’1)umem,ssf(x’,y’1)dx’dy’1 ð6Þ
zq
ð ð
G(x{x’,y1{y’1)jt(x’,y’1)dx’dy’1 ð7Þ
where _ u ussf(x,y1) is the rate of change of the activation level for
each bi-modal neuron across the spatial dimension, x, and the
shape dimension, y1, as a function of time, t. The constant t sets
the time scale of the dynamics. The current activation in the field
is given by, ussf(x,y1). This component is negative so that
activation changes in the direction of the neuronal resting level,
hssf. The next term in the equation specifies noise on the neuronal
resting level, where hq is the strength of the noise modulation, and
jt is a white noise process sampled independently through time
from a uniform distribution. The final two terms in line (1) specify
task-specific contributions (see below): htest lowers the resting level
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while St(x,y1) specifies localized inputs to the field caused by, for
instance, the presentation of the toy on the left or right side of the
table. Note that inputs to the field generally took the form of
localized, two-dimensional Gaussian distributions (see (8) below),
except where noted in the model procedures section below.
The next term in the equation (line 2) specifies locally-excitatory
interactions within the space-shape field. These excitatory
interactions are given by the convolution of a two-dimensional
Gaussian kernel with a sigmoidal threshold function. The
Gaussian kernel was specified generically by:
G(x{x’,y{y’)~ce,xexp {
(x{x’)
2
2s2
e,x
"#
zce,yexp {
(y{y’)
2
2s2
e,y
"#
, ð8Þ
with excitatory strengths, ce, and excitatory widths, se. The level of
activation required to enter into the interaction was determined by
the following generic sigmoidal function:
L u(x,y) ðÞ ~
1
1zexp {bu(x,y) ½ 
ð9Þ
where b is the slope of the sigmoid. The slope determines whether
neurons close to threshold (i.e., 0) contribute to the activation
dynamics with lower slope values permitting graded activation
near threshold to influence performance, and higher slope values
ensuring that only above-threshold activation contributes to the
activation dynamics.
Line 3 in the equation specifies local contributions to lateral or
surround inhibition. This local component of the inhibitory
interactions is specified by the convolution of a Gaussian kernel
with a sigmoidal function. Note that the widths of the lateral
inhibitory interactions, si, are larger than the excitatory widths, se.
In addition to lateral inhibition, there is also a global inhibitory
contribution that is constant across the field dimensions and scaled
by a strength parameter, ki.
The fourth contribution to the field dynamics specifies the
contribution of above-threshold activation in the space-color field
(scf) to the space-shape field (ssf). All above-threshold activation in
the space-color field is integrated across the color feature
dimension, y2, and projected uniformly across the shape dimension
in the space-shape field. Note that this projection is via the
convolution of a Gaussian kernel with the integrated activity. This
enables the ‘binding’ of multiple features across the shared spatial
dimension. For instance, a peak in the space-color field will project
a spatial ‘ridge’ across the space-shape field at the spatial location
associated with the space-color peak. In a sense, the space-color
peak reaches out to find an associated spatial pattern in the space-
shape field. A similar form of coupling happens in line 5 between
the space-shape field (ssf) and the label-shape field (lsf). In this case,
above-threshold activation in the label-shape field is integrated
across the label dimension and projected (via a Gaussian
convolution) uniformly across the space dimension in the space-
shape field. This enables peaks with particular shape values to
reach out and find associated shape patterns in the space-shape
field.
The sixth contribution to the field dynamics reflects a Hebbian
contribution. Here, traces in a Hebbian layer (see (10) below) are
convolved with a Gaussian kernel and passed as input to the space-
shape field. This boosts activation in the space-shape field at the
sites of previously consolidated peaks, priming the field dynamics
to re-build peaks at these same locations. The final contribution to
the activation dynamics in line 7 is spatially correlated noise which
is the convolution of a Gaussian kernel with a field of white noise
sources scaled by the noise strength parameter, q.
The equation for activation in the space-color field, uscf,i s
identical to the equation for the space-shape field except the
feature dimensions, y1 and y2, are reversed. Next, the equation for
activation in the label-shape field, ulsf, is identical to the equation
for the space-shape field except the feature dimensions, x and z,
are reversed. Finally, the equation for the label-color field, ulcf,i s
identical to the equation for the space-shape field except the
feature dimensions, y1 and y2, are reversed and the feature
dimensions, x and z, are reversed. Note that in the Faubel and
Scho ¨ner [24] model, the label dimension consisted of a collection
of one-dimensional fields to capture the arbitrary ordering of
labels. We realized a similar picture with a continuous label
dimension, z, by ensuring that the labels probed were always
metrically far from one another and using parameters that
instantiated winner-take-all competion between labels.
Longer-term learning in the DNF model is achieved by a
Hebbian layer associated with each neural field. Each layer
specifies learning via an activation trace variable, umem, as follows
(example shown is for the space-shape Hebbian layer):
_ u umem,ssf(x,y1)~
1
tbuild
{ussf,mem(x,y1)z^(ussf(x’ ,y’ 1))
  
if ussf(x,y1)§0
1
tdecay
{ussf,mem(x,y1)
  
otherwise
8
> > <
> > :
ð10Þ
This specifies that the rate of change of activation traces in the
Hebbian layer is determined by a build timescale, tbuild, if there is
above threshold activation in the space-shape field (i.e., activation
in that field $0). In this case, traces grow toward a value of 1.
Otherwise, Hebbian traces decay back to 0 according to a decay
timescale, tdecay. Note that the timescale of change in the Hebbian
layers is much longer than the real-time scale of the neural
activation dynamics (i.e., tbuild&t).
Model parameters
Table 1 reports the global field parameters, the parameters for
the space-feature and label-feature fields, the parameters for the
Gaussian projections between fields, and the parameters for the
Hebbian layers. To set the specific parameter values, we adopted
the following procedure. First, we began with parameter values
from a related project probing the neural dynamics of early word
learning. The goal of this complementary modeling project—
which used the same neural architecture—was to examine
whether a single model of early word learning could qualitatively
capture a host of phenomena, including enhanced performance in
a comprehension task relative to a production task early in word
learning; the developmental emergence of a shape-bias when
generalizing novel names for novel solid objects [62]; referent-
selection in a canonical ‘‘fast-mapping’’ task; and learning of
names at different levels of a category hierarchy. This model
qualitatively captured all of these phenomena.
Next, we modified values of several parameters from this initial
parameter set with an eye toward quantitatively simulating the
empirical means from the present study across all experiments
with a single parameter set (with the exception of changes in inputs
needed to capture the experimental procedures—see below). This
led to changes in six parameter values (relative to those in [24]).
First, we increased the resting level of the space-feature fields from
h=26.8 to 26.35 (see Table 1) and increased the strength of the
projections across the spatial dimension from ce=.15 to .162. This
enhanced the excitatory interactions within the space-feature fields
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binding errors that occured on some trials. Next, we lowered the
resting level of the label-feature fields from h=26.5 to 211.55 to
implement the winner-take-all interactions from Faubel and
Scho ¨ner [24]. Third, we lowered the resting levels of the fields
during the test trials by 20.1 units. This increased competitive
interactions in the fields at test, similar to the increased
competition on forced-choice trials used by Samuelson et al.
[21]. Next, we decreased the strength of spatially-corrleated noise
in the fields from q=.1 to .075. Finally, we decreased the build
timescale (tbuild) in the Hebbian layers from 5000 to 4500 to
accumulate long-term memory traces a bit faster. This was
particularly critical for robust performance in the control
condition of Experiment 4 where the model had to quickly learn
about an object in a single trial.
In summary, then, the core parameter values shown in Table 1
reflect a constrained simulation approach in that only 13.6% of the
parameter values were modified relative to the initial parameter set
imported from a different modeling project with different goals.
Although we did have to tailor six parameter values to meet our
objectives, it is useful to place these parameter modifications in
context. In the present study, we simulated children’s performance
across 28 total test trials from 7 different conditions (see Fig. 2).
Moreover, we required that the model correctly bind features and
locationsacross30totalfamiliarization trialsfrom7conditions.Thus,
in total, the model had to correctly bind object features and
quantitatively matchchildren’sperformance across a totalof58 trials.
In addition to the parameter values in Table 1, we also had to
specify the details of the inputs used across experimental
conditions. The labeing input had strength cz=8 and width
sz=1. The pointing input had strength cx=4 and width sx=1in
Experiments 1 and 2 and strength cx=1.9 and width sx=40 in
Experiment 3 to capture the broad spatial cue in that experiment.
Note that there was no pointing input in Experiments 4 and 5 (as
in the procedure with children). Finally, the object input had
strenght c=5 and width s=3. White noise sampled independently
through time from a uniform distribution was added to the
strength of the object inputs.
The object inputs were always presented at spatial positions 20
and 70 during familiarization and re-presentation, except in
Experiment 5 where the objects were presented at the center of the
field (position 45). Which object was assigned to each spatial
position was determined by the experimental procedure (see main
text). During test, the object presented at position 70 was moved to
central position 40, and the object presented at position 20 was
moved to central position 50; thus, if the model had a spatial bias
at test it would consistently choose the incorrect object (which did
not occur). Note also that the spatial position of the pointing input
in Experiment 3 was shifted to position 15 instead of position 20.
This reflected the poorly localized spatial input in this experiment.
Simulations
Simulations were conducted in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc.) on a
HP Pavillion e9820t computer with 8 processors running at 3.3
gigahertz(codeavailableupon request).The dynamicfieldequations
were integrated using the Euler method. Each run of the model
simulated the experienceof asinglechild inan experiment consisting
of between 2 and 10 events (see Fig. 1). The same model with the
sameparameters(see Table1)wasused inallsimulation sets. Models
were initialized with a small starting vocabulary corresponding that
of the 18-month-old children who participated in the experiments.
Thisstartingvocabularywasidenticaltothe earlyvocabularyusedin
our previous modeling work.
Trials began with the field at the neuronal resting level for 100
timesteps. On each familiarization trial, an object’s shape and
color were presented to object- and location-specific sites in the
space-shape and space-color fields respectively for 300 time steps.
During the pointing event on the naming trial, a ridge of activation
centered at the spatial location of one of the two objects was sent
into the shape-feature fields for 700 timesteps. At the same time, a
ridge of activation corresponding to the novel label was presented
to the label-feature fields. The two re-presentation events were
identical to the familiarization events. The test event began with
the presentation of the object features corresponding to the two
objects at a central location in each of the feature-space fields for
300 timesteps. Then, after a 300 timestep delay, a ridge of
activation corresponding to the name was presented in each of the
label-feature fields for 700 timesteps. The response was deter-
mined by taking the location of the maximum activation in the
feature-space fields at the end of a 100 timestep response interval.
Individual simulations verified that the response peaks were in the
exact location of one of the test objects.
Simulations for the Switch condition of Experiment1, and
Experiments 2–4 were identical except for differences to replicate
the experimental details. The objects switched locations in the
feature-space fields to capture the Switch condition of Experiment
1. No bucket inputs were presented to the feature-space fields on
the naming trial to simulate Experiment 2. To capture the more
diffuse spatial cue during the naming event in Experiment 3, the
ridge sent in to the feature-space fields was broader and poorly
localized (see Table 1). In the Space v. Time condition of
Experiment 4, the spring, for example, was presented on the right
during familiarization but the left during the naming trial, while in
the Control condition only the naming and test events occurred.
For Experiment 5 a centrally-located but distinctive color cue was
presented along with each object. Otherwise, this simulation
proceeded as for Experiment 2. Results are averages over 12
batches of 100 simulations (i.e., 12 participants) in each
experiment.
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